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As every country in the world struggles with the ong i g COVID-19 pandemic, it is essential 
that as many people as possible understand the epidmic containment, elimination and 
exclusion strategies required to tackle it. Simplified arithmetic models of COVID-19 
transmission, control and elimination are presented in user-friendly Shiny and Excel formats 
that allow non-specialists to explore, query, critique and understand the containment 
decisions facing their country and the world at large. Although the predictive model is 
broadly applicable, the simulations presented are bs d on parameter values representative of 
the United Republic of Tanzania, which is still early enough in its epidemic cycle and 
response to avert a national catastrophe. T  predictions of these models illustrate (1) why 
ambitious lock-down interventions to crush the curve represent the only realistic way for 
individual countries to contain their national-level epidemics before they turn into outright 
catastrophes, (2) why these need to be implemented so arly, so stringently and for such 
extended periods, (3) why high prevalence of other pathogens causing similar symptoms to 
mild COVID-19 precludes the use of contact tracing as a substitute for lock down 
interventions to contain and eliminate epidemics, (4) why partial containment strategies 
intended to merely flatten the curve, by maintaining epidemics at manageably low levels, are 
grossly unrealistic, and (5) why local elimination may only be sustained after lock down ends 
if imported cases are comprehensively excluded, so international co-operation to 
conditionally re-open trade and travel between countries certified as free of COVID-19 
represents the best strategy for motivating progress towards pandemic eradication at global 
level. The three sequential goals that every country needs to emphatically embrace are 
contain, eliminate and exclude. As recently emphasized by the World Health Organiz tion, 




Currently, half the world’s population is already under lock-down of some kind, meaning 
vertically enforced and severe restrictions of movement, and these measures may well need to 
be extended or re-imposed if the ongoing 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is 
to be contained (Chowdhury et al., 2020; Ferguson et al., 2020; Kissler, Tedijanto, Goldstein, 
Grad, & Lipsitch, 2020; Walker et al., 2020). Faced with such brutally difficult decisions, it is 
essential for policy-makers, health professionals, journalists and the general public that as 
many people as possible understand the stark consequences of the choices ahead of them. 
 
Methods 
Here we introduce a simplified arithmetic modelling tool for predicting COVID-19 
transmission dynamics and how it is likely to respond to different containment, delay or 
mitigation strategies. We coin the term arithmetic modelling, as distinct from the 
ubiquitously used term mathematical modelling, to convey the fact that it uses only addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division, rounding off, a few conditional statements (eg. if, less 
than/greater than, and/or), and two unavoidable power terms, to make the necssary 
calculations. This tool includes no differential equations, calculus, limits, distributions, 
stochastic simulations or agent-based approaches that would render it opaque to most non-
specialist readers, such as medical and public health practitioners, decision-makers, 
journalists and the general public. The model is presented in user-friendly Excel® and 
Shiny® formats that allow non-specialists to explore, query, critique and understand the 
containment decisions facing their country and the world at large 
(https://skiware.shinyapps.io/COVID19/). For those who wish to satisfy themselves that the 
calculations make intuitive sense, the Excel® version provides a complementary spreadsheet 
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format in which the formula for each cell can be critically examined. For those content to 
accept the underlying arithmetic, the Shiny® format provides a convenient interactive web 
application that can be used on any device. While a formal mathematical description of this 
model has been critically reviewed by specialist experts, it is provided only as an online 
supplement because none of the principles, assumptions or predictions are entirely new 
(Anderson, Heesterbeek, Klinkenberg, & Hollingsworth, 2020; Boldog et al., 2020; Chinazzi 
et al., 2020; Choi & Ki, 2020; De Salazar, Niehus, Taylor, Buckee, & Lipsitch, 2020; Fang, 
Nie, & Penny, 2020; Ferguson et al., 2020; Karako, Song, Chen, & Tang, 2020; Koo et al., 
2020; Kucharski et al., 2020; Kuniya, 2020; R. Li et al., 2020; Lin et al., 2020; Mandal et al., 
2020; Neher, Dyrdak, Druelle, Hodcroft, & Albert, 2020; Prem et al., 2020; Roosa et al., 
2020a, 2020b; B. Tang, N. L. Bragazzi, et al., 2020; B. Tang, X. Wang, et al., 2020; B. Tang, 
F. Xia, et al., 2020; Tariq et al., 2020; Walker et al., 2020; H. Wang et al., 2020; Wu, Leung, 
& Leung, 2020; Zhao & Chen, 2020), and because in our experience nothing deters non-
specialists from reading an article faster than equations do. 
We caution readers not to expect too much from any predictive model in terms of exact 
numerical reliability (Briggs, Sabel, & Lee, 2009; Christley et al., 2013; Enserink & 
Kupferschmidt, 2020) and note that this one is no different. We specifically advise against 
interpreting the exact numbers this tool generates  face value: Any predictive model is, by 
definition, a deliberately simplified representation f complex real-world processes, the 
usefulness of which is largely subjective (Briggs et al., 2009; Christley et al., 2013; Enserink 
& Kupferschmidt, 2020). The exact numerical predictions should therefore not be used to 
confidently define precise operational timelines for introducing and sustaining interventions, 
or set effectiveness thresholds required of specific ontainment measures. Instead, the 
purpose of this tool is to help users broadly understand the inevitable consequences of an 
uncontained epidemic, explore the likely outcomes a wide range of different possible 
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containment strategies, identify those which could plausibly succeed and understand the 
failures of those which seem unlikely to do so. 
Any users finding themselves forced to use numerical predictions from this model to make 
programmatic intervention decisions, presumably for want of a more reliable alternative in 
their specific context, should therefore assume sizable imprecisions that will not be possible 
to quantify  prospectively and will be too late to quantify retrospectively. They should 
therefore factor such unknown levels of uncertainty o their response plans by allowing for 
wide margins for error when planning the timing, intensity and duration of new interventions, 
always being more ambitious and cautious whenever in any doubt. 
Tanzania as an illustrative example of national containment options and requirements  
Assumed input parameters values were chosen to be repr sentative of the United Republic of 
Tanzania (Table 1), because it has experienced relatively modest inbound air traffic from 
China (Gilbert et al., 2020; Haider et al., 2020) and may still early enough in its epidemic 
cycle and response for a national catastrophe to beaverted. Tanzania has also had more 
opportunity to learn from ongoing experiences in Asia, Europe and north America, and 
prepare by establishing testing capacity at the outset of the national epidemic, more consistent 
with that simplifying assumption of the model than Asian and European countries affected 
earlier in the pandemic would be. Tanzania is also  typically vulnerable, low-income African 
country (Agyeman, Laar, & Ofori-Asenso, 2020; Gilbert et al., 2020; Lloyd-Sherlock, 
Ebrahim, Geffen, & McKee, 2020; Makoni, 2020; Nkengasong & Mankoula, 2020; J. Wang 
et al., 2020), which had only 38 ICU beds in all four national referral hospitals combined in 
2019 (Engdahl Mtango, Lugazia, Baker, Johansson, & Baker, 2019) and is representative of 
the pandemic that is now imminent all across Africa (Nkengasong & Mankoula, 2020; 
Pearson, Van Schalkwyk, Foss, O’Reilly, & Pulliam, 2020). 
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Having said that, most parameter values had to be obtained from elsewhere, particularly 
China, where the greatest volume of formal scientific investigation thus far originates from. 
Parameter values were selected to approximately match reasonable median values based on 
the widest variety of primary literature available at the time, all of which is cited in table 1. 
Literature considered for informing parameter values assumed in table 1, and for supporting 
the narrative generally, were identified by searching PubMed using the search terms 
“coronavirus” and “epidemiology”, “transmission”, “model” or “asymptomatic” up to 2nd 
April 2020. Only articles related to novel coronavirus-2019 and published in English were 
included. 
 
Table 1. Assumed values for input parameters of the arithmetic model as intended to be representative of 
COVID-19 transmission and successful epidemic containment in the United Republic of Tanzania (Figure 
1). A detailed formal description of how the model calculations are made, the underlying assumptions are 
provided in the online methodological supplement to this paper.  




Basic reproductive number (Average number of new 
infections arising from a single existing infection ver 
its full duration if allowed to do so in a fully 
susceptible, immunologically naïve population in the
absence of any control measures) 
4.0 (Anastassopoulou, Russo, Tsakris, & 
Siettos, 2020; T. M. Chen et al., 
2020; Choi & Ki, 2020; Kucharski et 
al., 2020; Mizumoto, Kagaya, & 
Chowell, 2020; Read, Bridgen, 
Cummings, Ho, & Jewell, 2020; 
Roosa et al., 2020a, 2020b; Sanche et 
al., 2020; Shim, Tariq, Choi, Lee, & 
Chowell, 2020; B. Tang, X. Wang, et 
al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020) 
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Duration of infection (Average number of weeks an 
infection lasts in a human before it is eliminated by the 
immune system). 
3 (Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 2020; 
Linton et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 
2020; A. Tang et al., 2020; Xing et 
al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020) 
Human population size 57 million (National Bureau of Statistics & 
Ministry of Finance and Planning Dar 
es Salaam and the Office of the Chief 
Government Statistician & Ministry 
of Finance and Planning Zanzibar, 
2018) 
Baseline incidence of unrelated similar symptoms 
(Proportion of population per week experiencing 
similar symptoms to COVID-19 but caused by other 
common pathogens like the common cold, influenza, 
malaria, etc) 
1% (BMJ Best Practice, 2020; Ghinai et 
al., 2020) 
Initial importation rate (Number of new primary cases 
arriving into the country each week) 
5 Assumed 
Time to initiation of importation containment 
intervention at border posts, airports and ports of entry 
(Number of weeks since the first imported cases before 
inbound travellers to the country are isolated on 
arrival) 
2 Assumed 
Time to initiation of lock-down intervention (Number 
of weeks since the first imported cases before 
population-wide restrictions are introduced to prevent 
personal exposure behaviours) 
5 Assumed 
Duration of lock-down intervention (Number of weeks 




prevent personal exposure behaviours until these 
restrictions are lifted) 
Asymptomatic proportion of cases (Proportion of all 
cases who lack, don’t notice or don’t report any overt 
symptoms associated with the infection) 
50% (Gostic, Gomez, Mummah, 
Kucharski, & Lloyd-Smith, 2020; R. 
Li et al., 2020; Mizumoto, Kagaya, 
Zarebski, & Chowell, 2020; Nishiura, 
Kobayashi, Suzuki, et al., 2020; 
Nishiura, Kobayashi, Yang, et al., 
2020; Nishiura, Linton, & 
Akhmetzhanov, 2020; Qiu et al., 
2020; Su et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 
2020) 
Proportion of symptomatic cases which are clinically 
severe (Percentage of all cases exhibiting and reporting 
with severe symptoms, all of whom are assumed to be 
tested unless the limits of testing capacity are 
exceeded) 
20% (Guan et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 
2020) 
Proportion of mild and severe symptomatic cases 
requiring critical care (Percentage of all cases 
exhibiting and reporting with any mild or severe 
symptoms who need intensive care, which can also be 
described as  
,,) 
4% (Guan et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 
2020; Yang et al., 2020) 
Intensive care unit (ICU) capacity (Maximum 
achievable percentage of the population that could be 
admitted to an ICU at a given time, allowing for 
maximum emergency expansion of capacity at short 
notice) 
0.0002% (Engdahl Mtango et al., 2019) 
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Case fatality rate in ICUs (Percentage of cases needi g 
intensive care who access it but die nevertheless)  
20% (Guan et al., 2020) 
Case fatality rate outside ICUs (Percentage of cases 
needing intensive care but who cannot access it and die 
subsequently) 
50% Assumed 
Maximum achievable diagnostic testing rate 
(Percentage of entire population per week) 
0.02% Assumed 
Proportional containment of imported cases 
(Percentage of secondary cases arising from primary 
imported cases which are prevented by travel 
restrictions and isolation of inbound travellers from 
affected countries on arrival) 
100% Assumed 
Proportional containment of contact clusters of 
confirmed cases (Percentage of secondary cases arising 
from diagnostic-confirmed primary cases which are 
prevented by contact tracing and isolation) 
90% (Ghinai et al., 2020; Pung et al., 
2020) 
Proportional lock down effectiveness (Percentage 
reduction of exposure behaviours behaviours, eg. close 
personal contact, sharing venues, transport, goods an  
other objects, among the fraction of the population 
included in and compliant with the lock down 
interventions) 
90% (C. Wang et al., 2020) 
Proportional lock down coverage (Percentage of entir  
population included in and compliant with 
interventions to reduce exposure behaviours, inclusive 
of staying indoors, avoiding other people, wearing face 
masks, and frequent hand washing) 





Public involvement in modelling tool development 
These modelling tools were initially piloted and refin d by providing with minimal 
instruction to one banker, one human resource manager, three general practitioners, one data 
scientist, one media officer, one epidemiologist, one paediatric oncologist, one medical 
statistician and one print and web journalist, all of whom reached conclusions overlapping 
with those of the authors. The modelling tools and simulation results were then shared and 
discussed with governmental decision makers, funding partners and health sector colleagues 
in Tanzania and Ireland. The modelling tools provided have since been used by the journalist 
end-user participant to generate graphs included in published articles advocating for 
consideration of crush the curve national strategies to contain, eliminate and exclude 
COVID-19. Both authors are actively engaged in dissemination to interested stakeholders and 
end users in Tanzania and Ireland. 
 
Results and Discussion 
COVID-19 may be eliminated and excluded by ambitious national containment 
campaigns 
The simplified model predicts that national containment and elimination may be achieved and 
sustained, without ever exceeding national ICU capaity, by using a full, timely package of 
interventions. The national epidemic may be contained with only 1486 cases and 6 deaths by 
highly rigorous 15-week lockdown (90% effective exposure prevention behaviours by 90% 
of the population) as soon the first cases are confirmed, 5 weeks into the epidemic, 
complemented by 90% effective tracing and isolation of all contacts for confirmed cases 
(Figure 1). National containment and elimination may indeed be achievable in principle if 
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highly rigorous lock down can be sustained for approximately 4 months, so recently 
suggested strategies to crush the curve (Fineberg, 2020) appear plausible. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figure 1. The predicted trajectory of a successfully contained national COVID-19 
epidemic in the United Republic of Tanzania. In this simulation, a rigorous 15-week lock 
down was initiated from week 5 onwards and complemented by complete containment of 
imported cases, as well as contact tracing and isolat on of confirmed cases. Rigorous lock 
down was assumed to achieve 90% reduction of exposure behaviours by 90% of the 
population. Complete 100% containment of imported cases assumes that all inbound 
international visitors are fully isolated for three w eks (Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 2020; 
Ling et al., 2020; Linton et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Xing et al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020), 
except those coming from countries that may be certified as free of local transmission by 
WHO in the future. Contact tracing and isolation follow up from confirmed cases was 
assumed to be 80% effective at preventing onward trnsmission from entire contact clusters. 
 
As points of reference against which ongoing national containment campaigns may 
benchmark themselves, the epidemic was predicted to grow 59% bigger each week at the 
outset and shrink by 48% each week once rigorous lock d wn had been in place for several 
weeks. Note, however, that even these alarming projecti ns for the rate of expansion of the 
epidemic and the rate of contraction required to contain it may under-represent the scale of 
the challenge in real epidemics. For example, at the outset of the epidemic in China, numbers 
of confirmed cases doubled every week (Q. Li et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020). Furthermore, 
subsequent analyses allowing for frequent carriage without overt symptoms indicate much 
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higher viral reproduction rates than assumed in table 1, and suggest true doubling time for all 
cases may be less than 3 days (Mizumoto, Kagaya, & Chowell, 2020; Sanche et al., 2020). 
Interesting, almost exactly the same containment trajectory is predicted even if contact 
tracing and isolation is completely removed from the intervention package (Supplementary 
figure 1), resulting in only 276 more cases and one more death. The explanation for this 
becomes apparent when one examines the trajectories of confirmed versus all cases: Even 
though the number of real cases never approaches an optimistically-assumed full testing 
capacity of 11,400 patients per week, half of all cses are never tested because they are 
asymptomatic and most of the remainder are only mildly symptomatic, so they get lost in the 
mass of other people who appear equally sick for unrelated to COVID-19. As illustrated in 
figure 1D, the background noise of similar mild symptoms caused by other common 
pathogens dwarfs the mild COID-19 cases, so almost all of them go untested and undetected. 
Less than one in every 4000 tests is conducted on a mildly symptomatic case of COVID-19, 
so even though we assume all severe cases are tested, only 11% of cases predicted to occur 
were confirmed. With contact tracing and isolation only being possible for this very small 
fraction of cases, there are obvious limits to how much it can achieve as a containment 
intervention in its own right. 
Even the slightest relaxation of lock down or importation controls cause containment 
failure 
However, successful containment (Figure 1) does requi s that the lock down intervention is 
maintained for the full 15 weeks (Figure 2A and B) to eliminate the virus. Delaying a 15-
week lock-down by only 3 weeks, the duration of onegeneration of viral infection, also 
allows the virus to persist and the epidemic resumes soon afterwards (Figure 2C and D). A 
slightly less rigorous lock down of the same duration, which nevertheless achieves 80% 
12 
 
coverage with 80% reductions of personal exposure behaviours, also fails to eliminate the 
epidemic with tragic consequences (Figure 2E and F).   
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Figure 2. The simulated epidemic trajectories for slightly less robust national COVID-
19 epidemic containment responses in the United Republic of Tanzania than that 
illustrated in figure 1, all of which are predicted to fail and result in a catastrophic 
rebound of transmission, morbidity and mortality. All these simulations have identical 
input parameters to figure 1 except for (1) shortening the lock down period by 3 weeks, from 
15 to 12 weeks (Panels A and B), (2) reducing importati n containment from 100% to 90%, 
(3) delaying the lock down by 3 weeks (Panels C and D), starting on week 8 rather than week 
5 (Panels E and F), and (4) reducing the coverage and protective effectiveness of exposure 
behaviour reduction from 90% to 80% (Panels G and H). 
 
Furthermore, elimination may only be sustained by comprehensively containing case 
importation from outside the country (Figure 2G and H). Preventing reintroduction requires 
isolation of all incoming travellers, except those coming from countries that may be certified 
as free of local transmission by WHO in the future, to achieve 100% prevention of onward 
local transmission (Figure 1). Even 90% containment of imported cases seems unlikely to 
protect the country against reintroduction of the virus and re-initiation of the epidemic 
(Figure 2G and H). Tanzania therefore did the right thing by isolating all inbound travelers 
since March 23rd for two weeks following their arrival). However, for such importation 
containment measures to effectively exclude new cases from a COVID-free Tanzania in the 
future, isolation periods may need to be extended to three weeks (Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 
2020; Ling et al., 2020; Linton et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Xing et al., 2020; Zou et al., 
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2020). However, it is also notable that all the scenarios in figure two, except for panels G and 
H, assume 100% effective containment of imported cases. It is therefore clear that local 
transmission must be eliminated before such rigorous control of inbound travellers can 
usefully protect the country against reintroduction. 
All these delays, truncations or inadequacies of lock down, or imperfections of importation 
containment, result in failure to eliminate local tr nsmission that then rebounds and rapidly 
spirals out of control without a second full contaiment campaign (Figure 2). The 
implications of such an uncontained rebound scenario are essentially identical to doing 
nothing in the first place: In all cases, 99% of the population is expected to become infected 
over about a year, resulting in approximately 540,00  deaths and ICU demand exceeding 
capacity about 800 times over. It is also worth noting hat total national hospital inpatient 
capacity of approximately 50,000 beds (Ministry of Health Community Development Gender 
Elderly and Children, 2018) would be overwhelmed by cases of severe COID-19 disease 
peaking at 2.3 million over a three-week period. Under such conditions of a full-blown public 
health catastrophe, the mitigating effect of stronger health systems in high income countries 
are largely negated, so our predictions of over half a million deaths in Tanzania compare well 
with those of others for the United Kingdom (Ferguson et al., 2020), which has a similar 
population size. Considering also the travel distances and household costs of hospital 
attendance in Tanzania (Lyimo & Mosha, 2019; Mhalu et al., 2019; Ngowi, Kamazima, 
Kibusi, Gesase, & Bali, 2017; Nyamuryekung'e, Lahti, & Tuominen, 2019), it also raises the 
question as to whether severe COVID patients should be cared for in hospitals and other 
health facilities (Bryson-Cahn et al., 2020; Glauser, 2020; Mahase, 2020a, 2020b) which are 
already 52% understaffed (Ministry of Health Community Development Gender Elderly and 
Children, 2019) or at home (Bryson-Cahn et al., 2020; Glauser, 2020; Mahase, 2020a, 2020b) 
with support from a rapidly mobilized cadre of Community Health Workers, for which well-
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characterized curricula and training platforms already exist (Baynes et al., 2018; Baynes et 
al., 2017; Ngilangwa & Mgomella, 2018). 
The mirage of flattening the curve to steadily acquire population-wide herd immunity 
The best-case scenario we could identify for “flattening the curve”, as advocated by many 
national and international authorities, required removing all importation controls to ensure 
steady re-seeding of the epidemic with a small number of cases and relaxing lock down 
assumptions to exactly 69% effective reduction of exposure behaviours among 69% of the 
population (Figure 3C and D). Under such precisely assumed conditions, the epidemic 
proceeds steadily with between 7 and 9 ICU cases per we k over a decade, at the end of 
which national ICU capacity has never been exceeded and only 1085 deaths will have 
occurred. However, at the end of such a 10-year campaign, with no end in sight for at least 
several decades, only 0.5% of the population would have acquired hard-won immunity 
through prior infection, so the remainder of the population would remain just as vulnerable to 
a resurgent epidemic. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Figure 3. The simulated epidemic trajectories for a less robust national COVID-19 
epidemic containment responses in the United Republic of Tanzania than that 
illustrated in figure 1, intended to flatten the curve enough for national health system 
capacity to cope while herd immunity is acquired over the long term. All these 
simulations have identical input parameters to figure 1 except that no importation 
containment is assumed and the coverage and protective ffectiveness of exposure behaviour 
reduction is assumed to be lower, at 68% (Panels A and B), 69% (Panels C and D) or 70% 




However, such precise control over real epidemics with such sensitive and extremely curved 
trajectories, will be unachievable in practice. Even lowering the assumed lock down coverage 
and effectiveness parameters for a simulated epidemic by only 1% to 68% results in a long 
drawn out peak that completely overwhelms ICU capacity within 3 years and continues to do 
so after a decade (Figure 3A and B), nevertheless leaving 91% of the population lacking 
acquired immunity. On the other hand, raising assumed lock down coverage and 
effectiveness by only 1% to 70% results in a long-drawn out containment trajectory that 
never reaches the elimination end game (Figure 3E and F) because the steady trickle of 
imported cases sustains transmission. Re-introducing complete containment of imported 
cases merely results in a more extended version of Figure 2E and F, with elimination taking 
over 6 years to achieve (Supplementary figure 2). 
Perhaps more to the point, simply expressing ICU capa ity as a proportion of overall 
population size pragmatically puts suggestions that countries should aim to merely slow and 
mitigate their COVID-19 epidemics into stark perspective. Even if Tanzania can build its 
ICU capacity from 38 to 114 beds in the coming weeks, and even if the whole population 
could be somehow perfectly queued up for COVID-19 exposure to make full sequential use 
of that capacity, assuming each patient needs only 1 week in the ICU and all regular causes of 
ICU admission magically disappeared, it would take lmost two centuries to care for the 1.14 
million COVID-19 cases expected. Readjusting such hypothetical calculations to represent 
higher capacity countries like Ireland or the UK shortens these timeline to decades rather than 
years, so “flattening the curve” to achieve population-wide “herd immunity” is clearly an 
infeasible and unwise choice. 
The spiralling costs of catching up on lost time to implement a lock down 
If a lock down is delayed by three weeks, approximately the duration of one viral infection, 
the epidemic may still be contained be extending it by he same length of time, from 15 
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weeks to 18 weeks (Figure 4A and B). Note, however, that the epidemic peaks at an almost 
four-fold higher incidence of cases, resulting in 5,485 cases and 22 deaths overall. Although 
ICU capacity is not expected to be overwhelmed, timely access will clearly represent a 
challenge for many patients in country with a surface rea of almost a million square 
kilometres and only four national referral hospitals. Longer delays of 6, 9 and 12 weeks 
necessitate prolonged lock downs (21 weeks for the latt r) to contain epidemics of rapidly 
expanding scale: 19925, 77055 and then 260103 cases, exceeding ICU capacity by 151, 994 
and 4597 patients, and resulting in 125, 586 and 2420 fatalities, respectively. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Figure 4. The simulated epidemic trajectories for national COVID-19 epidemic 
containment responses in the United Republic of Tanzania with slightly delayed or less 
rigorous lock down than illustrated in figure 1, all of which necessitated extension of the 
lock down period to achieve successful containment. All these simulations have identical 
input parameters to figure 1 except for (1) delaying the lock down by 3 weeks, starting on 
week 8 rather than week 5 (Panels A and B), (2) reducing the coverage and protective 
effectiveness of exposure behaviour reduction from 90% to 80% (Panels C, D, E and F), (3) 
removing the contact tracing and isolation component (Panels E and F), and (4) necessarily 
extending the lock down period from 15 to 18 weeks (Panels A and B) or from 15 to 40 
weeks (Panels C, D, E and F). 
 
The hidden dangers of stealthy epidemics 
Note, however, that none of this will be obvious during the silent early phase of the epidemic, 
during which time the number of undetected cases snowballs: Even if the lock down response 
is initiated after only 5 weeks post-initiation, immediately after the first 6 cases are confirmed 
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in this simulation, the epidemic has already quietly progressed much further than most 
members of the public would guess. Indeed, far enough that another 271 people are already 
actively infected and almost 1000 new cases are predicted to occur in the subsequent 3-week 
period, out of which only 108 (11%) will be detected. 
Infectious carriers who exhibit little or no symptoms at the time (Covid-19 National 
Emergency Response Center, Case Management Team, & Prevention, 2020; Dong et al., 
2020; Du et al., 2020; Hoehl et al., 2020; Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 2020; Ki & Task Force 
for -nCo, 2020; Lai et al., 2020; C. Li et al., 2020; P. Li et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2020; 
Mizumoto, Kagaya, Zarebski, et al., 2020; Nishiura, Kobayashi, Suzuki, et al., 2020; 
Nishiura, Kobayashi, Yang, et al., 2020; Qiu et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2020; 
Su et al., 2020; A. Tang et al., 2020; Tian et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 2020; Yu, Zhu, Zhang, 
Han, & Huang, 2020; Zou et al., 2020) clearly contribute to the cryptic nature of an early-
stage COVID-19 epidemic: In this case we assumed this accounts for 50% of cases lacking 
symptoms overt enough to consider self-reporting and seeking a test (table 1). However, a 
much more important factor is the sheer volume of background noise arising from similar 
symptoms caused by more common pathogens, such as the common cold and malaria. Even 
though these simulations assume that capacity for conducting 11,400 COVID-19 tests per 
week would have been established in Tanzania before the outbreak began, total confirmed 
cases are only expected to exceed 100 about 3 weeks aft r the lock down is introduced. Most 
of these confirmed cases are accounted by the clinica ly severe fraction we assume will all be 
tested. Only 4% (8/899) of predicted mild or asymptomatic cases are expected to be 
confirmed because the relatively small number of COVID-19 cases are so easy to miss in a 
population of 57 million people, out of whom we assume 1% or 570,000 will experience a 
fever, cough or stomach pains in any given week for unrelated reasons (Figure 1B and D). 
Note, however, that that even this is a very conservative assumption about background rates 
18 
 
of illness with similar symptoms to COVID-19: In the first contact-tracing study in the USA, 
over 12% of all carefully-followed contacts became symptomatic within 2 weeks, even 
though none of them became infected with COVID-19 (Ghinai et al., 2020). 
These simulations are nevertheless useful in that they illustrate how no perceptible increase in 
the incidence of such common symptoms may be obvious t  the general population unless 
containment efforts fail and a full-scale, resurgent epidemic sweeps through the country 
(Figure 2). Tanzania therefore did exactly the right thing by reacting fast during the silent 
earliest phase of the epidemic, announcing school cl sures within a day of the first confirmed 
case report and introducing additional restrictions immediately afterwards. 
Note, however, that the quiet tail of a fading epidmic may be just as dangerous as the it’s 
silent onset. Three of the four scenarios in figure 2 include periods of two month or more 
when few if any confirmed cases are expected, but some mild cases persist that can re-seed 
the whole epidemic afresh. The predicted persistence of the epidemic despite total predicted 
cases dropping below zero is an artefact of the simplified deterministic form of the model, 
which calculates case numbers as a continuous decimal outcome until it drops below 0.1, at 
which point it is set to 0 because the probability of elimination is 90% or better. The take-
home message is nevertheless clear: persist with rigorous lock-down until one can be sure 
that elimination has been achieved, drawing on statistical approaches used by veterinary 
epidemiologists to certify elimination with imperfect surveillance systems (A. Cameron, 
Njeumi, Chibeu, & Martin, 2014; A. R. Cameron & Baldock, 1998a, 1998b; Martin, 
Cameron, Barfod, Sergeant, & Greiner, 2007; Martin, Cameron, & Greiner, 2007; Stresman, 




The vital importance of ambition and rigour to lockdown outcome: Who dares loses 
least! 
As illustrated by figure 4C and D, it is now crucial that Tanzania urgently builds on that early 
momentum to ramp up lock down efforts to the most rigorous level practically attainable. The 
implications of even a slightly less rigorous lock down appear less daunting in 
epidemiological terms but far more severe in practic l and economic terms, because it greatly 
prolongs the lockdown period required: Even reducing overage and effectiveness of 
personal protection measures by only 10%, from 90% to 80% requires that the lock down 
period is extended by more than 150%, from 15 weeks to 40 weeks (Figure 4C and D). The 
practical social and economic sustainability of such a protracted lock down period is very 
questionable, but much can be learned from the predicted benefits of getting such an 
imperfect lock down started in good time: The 1,108 cases and 11 deaths predicted over the 
course of such a “slow burn” containment campaign are only marginally higher than for the 
best case scenario illustrated in figure 1. It is therefore important to get some form of 
reasonably rigorous lock down in place as early as possible, and then intensify it as rapidly as 
possible. Like any race, it is critical to get an early head-start by any means possible, but then 
build up speed towards a strong finish. 
While compliance and enforcement is of great importance to lock down effectiveness, so is 
acceptability and socio-economic feasibility. While high income countries move to facilitate 
population-wide compliance with direct financial support and augmented social services, 
different tactics will be required in low income countries like Tanzania. Although Tanzania is 
urbanizing very rapidly, most of the population still resides in rural areas (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2018) where propagation of directly-transmitted diseases like COVID-19 is always 
less intense. Fortunately, Tanzania is currently in the midst of this year’s farming season, 
during which many rural families are out in the fields where social distancing is relatively 
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easy. While farming season also conveniently brings a lull in trading activity at commercial 
hubs in rural towns and villages, it also represent a seasonal low point in the domestic food 
reserves of many rural households, so selective food support may be invaluable for enabling 
the most vulnerable families to comply effectively with self-quarantine and self-isolation 
directives. However, the growing urban population represents a much larger challenge, 
because far fewer people rely on farming for their livelihoods. Many live in crowded 
informal settlements where lack of shelter, water, sanitation and space, relying on unreliable, 
informal sources of income to survive on a day-to-day basis. Informal livelihoods and 
settlements in the busiest urban centres of the country will therefore require particularly 
urgent attention and creativity, to support daily food, water and hygiene needs. It may also be 
useful to consider providing safe transport with managed social distancing (to be followed by 
self-isolation) for those with options to sit out the epidemic with family and friends in rural 
areas. 
As is the case for elimination of other diseases, such as malaria for example (Killeen et al., 
2013), it may be more useful to think about gaps in coverage and effectiveness to understand 
how such apparently minor deficiencies can make all the difference between success and 
failure: While a shift from 90% to 80% lock down coverage and effectiveness might seems 
small in relative terms, a 20% shortfall relative to perfect containment is twice as big as 10%. 
And the difference between 100% prevention of onward local transmission from imported 
cases contrasts starkly with even such high targets as 90%: when you need to achieve zero 
new cases in a country, any other number simply isn’t good enough.  
In practical terms, we should first think of most the vulnerable, such those lacking homes, 
shelter, security, citizenship or family support (Ahmed, Ahmed, Pissarides, & Stiglitz, 2020; 
Liem, Wang, Wariyanti, Latkin, & Hall, 2020; Poole, Escudero, Gostin, Leblang, & Talbot, 
2020), especially those in the low income countries at greatest risk (Agyeman et al., 2020; 
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Ahmed et al., 2020; Gilbert et al., 2020; Lloyd-Sherlock et al., 2020; J. Wang et al., 2020). 
Beyond these long-neglected population groups, the most important lock down coverage and 
effectiveness gaps will be accounted for by the most important exceptions to restrictions and 
those exceptional individuals most determined to evad  them. 
Unfortunately, the most obvious exceptions to lock down restrictions who will facilitate 
continued transmission will be health service personnel (Bedford et al., 2020; Bhadelia, 2020; 
Rose, 2020; Z. Zhang et al., 2020), notably those caring for those most vulnerable to the 
disease. However, all other essential workers in shop , markets, kitchens, food processing 
facilities, factories, banks, post offices, transport services and law enforcement agencies will 
also inevitably mediate more transmission than theywould if they stayed at home. Indeed, it 
the crew that enabled self-sustaining levels of COVID-19 transmission to persist aboard the 
quarantined Diamond Princess cruise ship (Mizumoto & Chowell, 2020). It is also worth 
remembering that the anti-hero of infectious disease epidemiology, the infamous Typhoid 
Mary worked in the service industry and might be classified as an essential worker today 
(Box 1). This is not to say that such essential servic s should necessarily be suspended, but 
rather that the roles and working practices of these personnel should be scrutinized 
particularly carefully. How essential is essential? What is the minimum level of service 
needed to facilitate extended lock down while mitigating indirect effects on health, well-
being and economic welfare that are even worse than COVID-19? What procedures, 
behaviours and protective equipment could most effectiv ly minimize persistent workplace 
transmission? 
 
Box 1. Typhoid Mary as an historical example of the kind of extremely non-
compliant, asymptomatic, super-spreader individual who might evade lock down as 
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an essential worker today 
Typhoid Mary (real name Mary Mallon, from Tyrone in Northern Ireland) was a cook by 
profession who infected at least 53 people, three of wh m died (Soper, 1939). Like many 
COVID-19 cases (Covid-19 National Emergency Response Center et al., 2020; Dong et al., 
2020; Du et al., 2020; Hoehl et al., 2020; Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 2020; Ki & Task 
Force for -nCo, 2020; Lai et al., 2020; C. Li et al., 2020; P. Li et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2020; 
Mizumoto, Kagaya, Zarebski, et al., 2020; Nishiura, Kobayashi, Suzuki, et al., 2020; 
Nishiura, Kobayashi, Yang, et al., 2020; Qiu et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Shi et al., 
2020; Su et al., 2020; A. Tang et al., 2020; Tian et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 2020; Yu et 
al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020), Mary was a silent carrier of the disease: She herself lived to a 
ripe old age and died of a stroke rather than typhoid. Mary repeatedly returned to working 
as a cook because it paid better and frequently changed jobs as people fell ill around her, 
even changing her name to evade more than 30 years of quarantines imposed on her. It 
took 4 policemen over three hours to apprehend her espite a stealthy approach and forced 
entry to her home. Eventually Mary was found hiding i  an outside closet at the rear of a 
neighbour’s house, and things remained spicy following her arrest: 
“She fought and struggled and cursed. I tried to explain to her that I only wanted the 
specimens and that then she could go back home. She again refused and I told the 
policemen to pick her up and put her in the ambulance. This we did and the ride down to 
the hospital was quite a wild one." (Soper, 1939) 
When we read about the ongoing “Coronavirus challenge” game mediated through social 
media, or of groups of grown adults meeting to share a few drinks in public places during 
official lock down periods, we are inclined to think the spirit of Mary Mallon is alive and 
well and will need to be curbed. The experiences of th se who knew Mary Mallon seem 
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extreme but are difficult to disregard completely in the context of a pandemic threatening a 
global population of over 8 billion people with more eccentric characters, miscreants and 
outright criminals than we would wish in the circumstances: 
“Mary was now about forty-eight years of age and a good deal heavier than she was when 
she slipped through a kitchen full of servants, jumped the back fence and put up a fight 
with strong young policemen. She was as strong as ever, but she had lost something of that 
remarkable energy and activity which had characterized her young days and urged her 
forward to meet undaunted whatever situation the world presented to her. In these eight 
years since she was first arrested, she had learned what it was to yield to other wills than 
her own and to know pain.” (Soper, 1939) 
 
And with so many people’s livelihoods on the lines, we may be asking too much of human 
nature by expecting everyone to do the right thing voluntarily. Many of the greatest public 
health campaigns in history have necessitated an authoritarian style, and it may be necessary 
for people all over the world to temporarily embrace and accept new restriction measures 
they would otherwise justifiably describe as draconian. Perhaps the single most important 
take-home message of the widely-accepted 80-20 rule of epidemiology (less than 20% of 
people cause more than 80% of transmission) (Woolhouse et al., 1997) is that the extremes of 
human circumstances and behaviour, especially during mass gatherings and population 
movements, are more important to the survival of pathogens than the average. It inevitably 
follows that such exceptions are vitally important to arget if one wishes to eliminate COVID-
19 (S. Chen, Yang, Yang, Wang, & Barnighausen, 2020; Ebrahim & Memish, 2020; Frieden 
& Lee, 2020; Liu, Eggo, & Kucharski, 2020). Again, t is worth remembering Typhoid Mary 
(Soper, 1939), who resisted repeated efforts to get her out of the kitchen and did nothing to 
disprove stereotypes about the stubborn Irish (Box 1).  
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Contact tracing as an epidemiological surveillance platform, rather than an 
intervention per se 
As for the full, timely intervention package simulated in figure 1 (Compare with figure S1), 
removing contact tracing from the less rigorous but extended lock down intervention package 
has only a modest effect on the overall containment trajectory (Figure 4E and F), with only 
797 more cases and 3 additional fatalities. Under a the far more extreme conditions of a failed 
containment campaign, followed by a resurgent, full-blown epidemic, contact tracing 
becomes a rather pointless exercise, even for targeting clinical disease management. At the 
peak of the epidemic, when over 4 million new symptomatic cases may occur per week and 
even mortality rate may outstrip testing capacity (Figure 2), so case confirmation success 
rates may plummet to below 0.2%. 
However, such spectacular containment failures are to b  avoided at all costs and this 
simplified model only accounts for the direct preventative effects of follow up on subsequent 
transmission, so none of these simulations should be used to in any way imply that contact 
tracing and isolation should be de-prioritized. In particular, it does not account for the 
invaluable functions of contact tracing for monitoring and characterizing an epidemic (Ghinai 
et al., 2020; C. Li et al., 2020; P. Li et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2020; Pung et al., 2020; Yu et al., 
2020), and for understanding the influence of interventions on transmission dynamics. For 
example, the tracing of transmission to a relatively small number of clusters in Korea, and 
especially the incrimination of venues like the Shinc eonji Church provide invaluable 
insights that guide more rigorous, effective follow up on lock down measures (Shim et al., 
2020) In Ireland, early observations that mean size of close contact clusters had shrunk from 
20 to 5 were reported to the public as an encouraging early sign that behavioural 
interventions were impacting risks of onward transmission. Without such essential detailed 
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information about how transmission persists, as well as the strengths and weakness of 
ongoing intervention efforts, national containment programmes would be flying blind. 
It should be noted, however, that testing, contact tr ing and isolation of known contacts is 
only useful as part of a deliberate containment strategy that keeps an epidemic manageably 
small, and may be particularly useful for extinguishing the remaining embers of an 
effectively-contained epidemic (B. Tang, F. Xia, et al., 2020). While testing is always useful 
for clinical management of severe cases, once 1% or more of the population has been infected 
even this important subset of cases alone overwhelms testing capacity (Figure 2B, D, E and 
F) and the fraction of non-severe cases confirmed plummets to negligible levels. In any case, 
population-wide testing of mildly symptomatic cases b comes unhelpful as a guide to 
targeting containment measures: How does one selectively arget those at immediate risk 
when that means everyone? And how would we attempt contract tracing if we allowed the 
epidemic to grow to tens or hundreds of thousands of new cases each week? Note, however, 
that the expected failure of contact tracing, and indeed testing generally, is just one more 
good reason to contain national COVID-19 epidemics before they progress from emergencies 
(Figures 1 and 4) into outright catastrophes (Figure 2). 
Limitations, caveats and comparisons with other models 
Like other recent models of COVID-19, our simplified formulation does not attempt to 
predict complex indirect effects of the pandemic upon morbidity and mortality from other 
causes that will be exacerbated by the expected pressur s on a health system that is already 
overstretched (Enserink & Kupferschmidt, 2020). Nor d es it attempt to anticipate the extent 
of economic and social damage that will arise from different epidemic containment scenarios 
(Enserink & Kupferschmidt, 2020), partly because doing so would defeat the purpose of 
developing a simplified arithmetic formulation. 
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Despite its limitations as a relatively simple and untested model, the predictions described 
above are consistent with those of most other process-explicit models using more 
sophisticated mathematical formulations and specialist software (Anderson et al., 2020; 
Boldog et al., 2020; Chinazzi et al., 2020; Choi & Ki, 2020; Chowdhury et al., 2020; De 
Salazar et al., 2020; Fang et al., 2020; Ferguson et al., 2020; Karako et al., 2020; Koo et al., 
2020; Kucharski et al., 2020; Kuniya, 2020; R. Li et al., 2020; Lin et al., 2020; Mandal et al., 
2020; Neher et al., 2020; Prem et al., 2020; Roosa et al., 2020a, 2020b; B. Tang, N. L. 
Bragazzi, et al., 2020; B. Tang, X. Wang, et al., 2020; B. Tang, F. Xia, et al., 2020; Tariq et 
al., 2020; Walker et al., 2020; H. Wang et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Zhao & Chen, 2020), as 
well as recent reports of success from China (Gong et al., 2020; Prem et al., 2020; B. Tang, F. 
Xia, et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 2020; S. Zhang et al., 2020) In fact, perhaps the most useful 
new lessons to be learned come from a few studies that reach substantively different 
conclusions based on markedly different underlying assumptions. 
Our predictions that contact tracing and isolation will play only a minor role in successful 
containment contrast with those of others (Hellewell et al., 2020) which assumed 
asymptomatic carriage by only 10% of cases or less,and which do not account for the 
detection dilution effect of similar mild symptoms caused by other common pathogens 
(Figure 2B, D, F, H). 
On the other hand, the predictions presented here app ar relatively optimistic when compared 
with recent reports suggesting viral reproduction rates are higher than generally thought 
(Mizumoto, Kagaya, & Chowell, 2020; Sanche et al., 2020) because previous analyses failed 
to consider the likelihood that large fractions of cases may go undetected (Dong et al., 2020; 
Mizumoto, Kagaya, Zarebski, et al., 2020; Nishiura, Kobayashi, Suzuki, et al., 2020; 
Nishiura, Kobayashi, Yang, et al., 2020; Qiu et al., 2020; Su et al., 2020; C. Wang et al., 
2020) because they exhibit only mild, non-specific symptoms, if any (Covid-19 National 
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Emergency Response Center et al., 2020; Hoehl et al., 2020; Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 
2020; Ki & Task Force for -nCo, 2020; Lai et al., 2020; C. Li et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2020; 
Nishiura, Kobayashi, Yang, et al., 2020; Qiu et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2020; 
Su et al., 2020; A. Tang et al., 2020; Tian et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020). As 
underlined right at the outset of the global respone (Q. Li et al., 2020; Munster, Koopmans, 
van Doremalen, van Riel, & de Wit, 2020), the most important remaining question that needs 
to be answered to reduce the uncertainties of model predictions is the extent of asymptomatic 
carriage and infectiousness. Learning lessons from other diseases like endemic malaria, 
which is primarily a chronic illness transmitted by semi-immune adult carriers (Ross, Killeen, 
& Smith, 2006), the term asymptomatic may well be a misnomer, not only because some 
individuals become infectious before(Covid-19 National Emergency Response Center et al., 
2020; Du et al., 2020; Hoehl et al., 2020; Hu et al., 2020; P. Li et al., 2020; Nishiura, Linton, 
et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2020) or after (Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 2020; 
Ling et al., 2020; Linton et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Xing et al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020) 
exhibiting symptoms but also because it is often applied to those who are paucisymptomatic 
and shrug off mild symptoms to get on with their daily lives (I. Chen et al., 2016; Sifft et al., 
2016; C. Wang et al., 2020). 
A particularly important caveat arising from current u certainty about the role of cryptic 
carriers is that it also has a major influence on estimation of fatality rate for infections rather 
than clinical cases. The latest analyses allowing for this phenomenon suggest that fatality 
rates are may be 10 to 40 times lower per infection tha  per confirmed case (Anastassopoulou 
et al., 2020; Mizumoto, Kagaya, & Chowell, 2020), consistent with our conclusion that the 
vast majority of cases are never confirmed. While fatality rates are difficult to estimate 
directly (Battegay et al., 2020; Kobayashi et al., 2020), these modelling analyses support the 
conclusions of the most controlled empirical epidemiological studies, indicating that the 
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COVID-19 fatality rates may be comfortably below 1% (Nishiura, Kobayashi, Yang, et al., 
2020). The surge of severe cases and fatalities in an uncontained epidemic may therefore 
peak at a far lower level than those predicted in figure 2. However, much of the variation 
between fatality rate estimates appears related to geographic differences in health system 
capacity and burden (Battegay et al., 2020; Ji, Ma, Peppelenbosch, & Pan, 2020), so low 
income countries will be much more vulnerable. Even if the best worst-case scenario proves 
to be less catastrophic than previously projected (Anastassopoulou et al., 2020; Mizumoto, 
Kagaya, & Chowell, 2020), it will nevertheless overwhelm critical care capacity several 
times over and should be avoided if at all possible. 
 
Conclusions 
The current global health emergency demands immediate, bold, pre-emptive decisions in the 
absence of unambiguous evidence (Horton, 2018; Smith & Pell, 2003), based on our best 
understanding of COVID-19 epidemiology as it stands today (Anderson et al., 2020; Fauci, 
Lane, & Redfield, 2020; Horton, 2020). The three key s quential goals every country needs 
to embrace as early and emphatically as possible are contain, eliminate and exclude. Even 
when faced with the prospect of lock downs lasting 4 months or more, there is no place for 
more timid terms like slow, flatten or mitigate when faced with an epidemic capable of 
overwhelming ICU capacity hundreds of times over or taking several years of restrictions to 
slowly burn through an entire population at rates that ICUs can cope with. 
And tackling this pandemic will rely overwhelmingly upon widespread understanding and 
mass participation by the entire global public, rather than just the health professionals and 
high-level decision makers who will lead the response. Currently, half the world’s population 
is already under lock down of some kind, meaning vertically enforced and severe restrictions 
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of movement and physical interaction, and the remainder will have to follow if the ongoing 
COVID-19 virus pandemic is to be contained. Faced with such brutally difficult decisions, it 
is essential to policy-makers, health professionals and the general public that as many people 
as possible understand why stringent lock down interventions represent the only realistic way 
for individual countries to contain their national-level epidemics before they turn into public 
health catastrophes. It also vital for as many people as possible to understand why these need 
to be implemented so early, so aggressively and for such extended periods, to deliberately 
crush the curve (Fineberg, 2020) of epidemic trajectories. 
Over the medium-to-long term, it will also be vital for us all to understand why widespread 
decisive national action and international co-operation (Gong et al., 2020; S. Zhang et al., 
2020) will be required to conditionally re-open trade and travel between countries that have 
successfully eliminated local transmission. As explained by the simplified simulations 
presented here, this appears to be the only means by which national elimination efforts can be 
sustained, following which pandemic eradication may be pursued at global level. At a time 
when so many decision-makers are considering tempting justifications for relaxing unpopular 
lock down restrictions, it is now vital that the governments and citizens of every country 
instead embrace intensified containment, eliminatio and exclusion efforts. Unless we all 
respond constructively to the recent World Health Organization appeal for genuine national 
unity and global solidarity (World Health Organization, 2020), it appears unlikely that we 
can collectively defeat the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE LEGENDS 
Supplementary Figure 1. The predicted trajectory of a successfully contained national 
COVID-19 epidemic in the United Republic of Tanzania, achieved without any contact 
tracing and isolation. In this simulation, a rigorous 15-week lock down was initiated from 
week 5 onwards and complemented by complete containment of imported cases, as well as 
contact tracing and isolation of confirmed cases. Rigorous lock down was assumed to achieve 
90% reduction of exposure behaviours by 90% of the population. Complete 100% 
containment of imported cases assumes that all inbound international visitors are fully 
isolated for three weeks (Hu et al., 2020; Kam et al., 2020; Ling et al., 2020; Linton et al., 
2020; Rothe et al., 2020; Xing et al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020), except those coming from 
countries that may be certified as free of local trnsmission by WHO in the future. However, 
these simulations differ from figure 1 in that absolutely no contact tracing and isolation was 
assumed. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. The simulated epidemic trajectory for a less robust national 
COVID-19 epidemic containment responses in the United Republic of Tanzania than 
that illustrated in figure 1, intended to flatten the curve enough for national health 
system capacity to cope while also excluding importation of new cases. This simulation 
has identical input parameters to figure 3E and F except that complete importation 
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